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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This matter is a "slip and fall" case which arises from a lawsuit filed by Irina Shea 
against the Kevic Corporation d/b/a/ Lett's Downtown Carwash and which stems from 
an incident that occurred on January 22, 2011 when Ms. Shea fell while on the 
premises of the carwash and was injured. (In accordance with I.R.A. 35(d), the 
Appellant will hereinafter be referred to as "Shea" and the Respondent will hereinafter 
be referred to "Kevic.") Shea filed a lawsuit against Kevic for negligence. Kevic filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Ms. Shea testified that the ground 
where she fell was dry and that she did not know what caused her to fall. Further, there 
is no evidence that Kevic had any knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition. The 
District Court granted Kevic's Motion for Summary Judgment. Shea filed two Motions 
for Reconsideration, both of which were denied by the District Court. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Shea's Complaint was filed on November 14, 2011. Kevic's filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on June 21, 2012 along with supporting Memorandum and an 
Affidavit of Chris H. Hansen. (Augmented Record, hereinafter referred to as "AR"). AR 
Doc. No.1, pp. 6 - 22/148. On August 2, 2012, Shea filed a response to Kevic's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and an Affidavit of Henry Madsen. (AR Doc No.4, pp. 23 - 39). 
On August 10, 2012, Kevic filed a Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Henry 
Madsen, along with a supporting Memorandum. (AR, Doc. No.7, pp. 51 -57.) 
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On August 23, 2012, the District Court conducted a hearing pertaining to Kevic's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the Summary Judgment Motion and Kevic's 
Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Henry Madsen. TR 1- 23. A written Order 
reflecting the District Court's decisions was entered on September 5, 2012. (CR 27 -
31.) (Clerk's Record hereinafter is referenced as "CR") Both decisions by the District 
Court are being appealed by Shea. 
On September 5, 2012, Ms. Shea filed a Motion for Reconsideration, supported 
by an Affidavit of Irina Shea. (CR 38 - 65.) On September 14, 2012, Kevic filed a 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Irina Shea and supporting memorandum. (CR 50 - 66.) 
During a hearing on October 2, 2012, the Court denied Kevic's Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Irina Shea and also denied Shea's Motion for Reconsideration. (TR 24 -
31.) Written Orders documenting the Court's decisions were entered on October 18, 
2012. (CR 67.) Ms. Shea is appealing the District Court's denial of the first Motion for 
Reconsideration. Kevic is appealing the Court's denial of its Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Irina Shea. 
On October 17, 2012, Shea filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration. (AR Doc. 
No. 16, pp. 107 - 108.) On October 19, 2012, Kevic filed an Objection to the Second 
Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for an award of Attorney's Fees regarding 
Second Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(1) I.R.C.P. On November 1, 
2012, Shea filed a Memorandum in support of the Second Motion for Reconsideration 
and a Second Affidavit of Henry Madsen. (AR Doc. Nos. 8 and 9, pp. 112 - 131. In 
response to Shea's briefing, Kevic filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
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Plaintiff's Second Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion to Strike portions of Mr. 
Madsen's Affidavit dated November 1, 2012 and supporting Memorandum. (AR Doc. 
Nos. 14,21 and 22). 
On November 19, 2012, the District Court conducted a hearing pertaining to 
Shea's Second Motion for Reconsideration. (TR 30 - 45) The District Court denied 
Shea's Second Motion for Reconsideration, granted Kevic's Motion to Strike paragraph 
3 of the Affidavit of Henry Madsen and granted Kevic's Motion for Attorney's fees. TR 
30 - 45. The Court issued written Orders reflecting those decisions. (CR 76 - 81). 
Shea has appealed the District Court's decision denying her Second Motion for 
Reconsideration. Shea has not appealed the Court's Order to strike a portion of Mr. 
Madsen's Affidavit dated November 1, 2012 and the Court's decision awarding Kevic 
attorney's fees. 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts. 
On January 22, 2011, Ms. Shea entered the premises owned by Kevic to utilize the 
carwash. As Shea's vehicle entered the carwash, an attendant for Kevic adjusted the 
mirrors to allow her car to proceed through the carwash. After proceeding through the 
carwash, Ms. Shea exited her vehicle to adjust her mirrors. As she was walking around 
the front of the vehicle, Ms. Shea fell. Although her Complaint asserts that she slipped 
on ice, Ms. Shea's deposition testimony reveals that the area was dry and she does not 
know what she slipped upon. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following is the Respondent's restated issues on appeal. 
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1. Did the District Court err when it struck a portion of the Affidavit Henry 
Madsen? 
2. Did the District Court err when it granted Kevic's Motion for Summary 
Judgment? 
3. Did the District Court err when it denied the Plaintiff's First and Second 
Motions for Reconsideration? 
4. Should this Court award attorney's fees to Shea Corp. on appeal? 
III. CROSS APPEAL - ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A) Did the District Court err when it denied Kevic's Motion to Strike Shea's 
Affidavit which was filed after her deposition and after the Court had ruled on Kevic's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and which contained information which is inconsistent 
with her deposition testimony? 
B) Should this Court award attorney's fees to Kevic on appeal? 
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Kevic is claiming attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C.§ 12-121. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW - SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
When reviewing an appeal for the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court in ruling on the 
motion. Sadid v. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932, 936 (2011). The appellate 
court construes all disputed facts, and draws all reasonable inferences from the record, 
in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the 
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evidence in the record and any admissions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the issues stated in the pleadings and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
After the moving party has satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must then 
come forward with sufficient admissible evidence identifying specific facts 
demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Sherer v. Pocatello School 
District, No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489-90 (2006); IRCP 56(e). Such evidence may 
consist of affidavits or depositions as well as other material based upon personal 
knowledge which would have been admissible at trial. Id. at 490. Although 
circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue for trial, a mere scintilla of evidence 
is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Sherer 
supra at 489. 
Affidavits supporting or opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment shall set 
forth facts admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the Affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Gem State Insurance Company v. 
Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (Id. St. Ct. 2007). The admissibility 
of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a 
Motion for Summary is a threshold question to be answered before applying liberal 
construction and reasonable inference rules to determine whether the evidence is 
sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. Gem State Insurance, supra at 13. 
Summary Judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party bearing the burden of 
proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
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essential to the party's case. Carnell v. Barker Management, Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 
327,48 P.3d 651,656 (2002). 
B. THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PORTIONS OF HENRY MADSEN'S 
AFFIDAVIT DATED AUGUST 2, 2012. 
Prior to considering the merits of a motion for summary judgment, the Court must 
address any evidentiary issues before applying the liberal standards for summary 
judgment. When considering an evidentiary issue, this Court reviews evidentiary rulings 
from the trial court for an abuse of discretion. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 873, 
204 P.3d 508, 513 (S.Ct. 2009). When this Court examines a trial court's discretionary 
decision, it must be determined, "(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue 
as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable ... ; and (3) whether the 
trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Cramer, supra at 873. In this 
case, the evidentiary issue pertains to the District Court's decision striking paragraphs 3 
and 5 of Mr. Madsen's Affidavit. Each issue will be addressed separately. 
i) TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO PHOTOGRAPH (Paragraph 3). 
Paragraph 3 of Mr. Madsen's Affidavit sought to introduce excerpts from the 
deposition of Kevin Lett (principal of Kevic) with respect to a photograph that was taken 
of the carwash. At the time of Mr. Lett's deposition, Mr. Lett did not have any 
information as to when the photograph was taken and/or by whom the photograph was 
taken. Significantly, the photograph was not taken on the same day of the accident or 
shortly after the accident. There is no evidence, foundation or testimony which 
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indicates that the photograph accurately depicts the premises in the same or similar 
condition as the day of the accident. 
Photographs are generally admissible when the witness identifies the photograph 
and testifies that the photograph correctly portrays the scene or object. McKee v. 
Chase, 73 Idaho 491, 253 P.2d 787; Handbook of Evidence for the Idaho Lawyer, 
George M. Bell, 1987 (pg. 342). Here, there is no evidence that the photograph 
referenced in Mr. Madsen's Affidavit accurately reflected the conditions of the accident 
site at the time of the accident. Shea has not laid any foundation necessary to support 
the admissibility of the photograph. Significantly, the photograph appears to show that 
the entire area in front of the carwash was wet which is directly contrary to and 
inconsistent with the deposition testimony of Ms. Shea that the area around the carwash 
was "amazingly dry" on the day of the accident. (Deposition of Irina Shea, pg. 24 L 12-
19, CR pg 42). Thus, the photograph is entirely inconsistent with the Plaintiff's testimony 
and is deceptive. A photograph which is deceptive is not admissible. Riksem v. 
Hollister 96 Idaho 15523 P.2d 1361, 1362 (1974). 
On page 18 of the Opening Brief, Shea concedes that the photograph does not 
depict the condition of the premises on the day of the incident. Instead, she argues that 
the photograph somehow depicts the probability that there could be a buildup of water 
and/or ice. However, Shea's testimony is that there was no ice buildup. (Deposition of 
Irina Shea, p. 30, LL. 20 -25). (CR 44) Further, whether there is a probability of an ice 
build-up on some other day is irrelevant and immaterial. (Rule 402 I.R.E.). The relevant 
issue is the conditions which existed at the time of the accident. As noted below, Ms. 
RESPONDENTS/CROSS APPELLANT'S RESPONSE AND OPENING BRIEF - 7 
Shea repeatedly testified that the area was dry. Thus, a photograph that depicts a wet 
accident site is irrelevant, and inadmissible and the District Court properly excluded 
paragraph 3 of Mr. Madsen's Affidavit. 
ii) PARAGRAPH 5 OF AFFIDAVIT - LETTER FROM KEVIC'S 
INSURANCE CARRIER IS INADMISSIBLE. 
The other evidentiary issue pertains to Paragraph 5 of Mr. Madsen's Affidavit. 
which sought to introduce a letter from Kevic's insurance carrier. The letter from the 
insurance carrier is clearly hearsay (in fact, double hearsay). Hearsay is defined as "a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801 (c); State v. 
Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 704, 889 P.2d 729, 733 (Ct.App.1994). Hearsay is inadmissible 
unless otherwise provided by an exception in these rules or other rules of the Idaho 
Supreme Court. I.R.E. 802. 
Shea argues that the letter from Kevic's insurance carrier is a business record, a 
hearsay exception contained in Rule 803(6) I.R.E. (Apparently Shea recognizes that the 
letter constitutes hearsay and is inadmissible unless an appropriate exception is found). 
There is no evidence that the letter was prepared by, sent to or received by Kevic. 
Further, being a carwash, an accident investigation is not part of Kevic's regular 
business activity. Thus, the letter is not a business record of Kevic and Shea's reliance 
on Rule 803(6) is misplaced. 
A review of the letter reveals that the letter contains "double hearsay". The 
author of the letter is relying upon photographs, statements and diagrams provided by 
an "independent adjuster". Hearsay within hearsay is admissible under this rule provided 
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each part of the combined statements falls within an exception to the rule. I.RE 805. 
State v. Vivian, 129 Idaho 375, 378, 924 P.2d 637, 640 (1996). Shea has made no 
attempt to identify any exception to the hearsay rule for the information which is 
attributable to the independent adjuster. 
The letter also violates Rule 411 I.RE. which precludes evidence of liability 
insurance. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the general rule in Idaho that 
evidence of insurance is inadmissible to prove negligence. Loza v. Arroyo Dairy, 137 
Idaho 764, 53 P.3d 347 (Id. Ct. App. 2002). The letter is also irrelevant (Rule 402 
I.RE.) and the letter's prejudicial effect outweighs any probative value it may have. 
(Rule 403 I.RE.). Thus, the District Court properly excluded the letter from Kevic's 
Insurance carrier. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO KEVIC. 
The essence of the Shea's Complaint is negligence. In Idaho, a cause of action 
in negligence requires, 1). The existence of a duty, recognized by law, requiring the 
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; 2). A breach of that duty; 3). A 
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and 4). 
Actual loss or damage. Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., supra, 150 Idaho, 774, 777, 
251 P.3d 602, 604 (Ct.App. 2011). In Idaho, a person may be an invitee, licensee or 
trespasser. Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 399, 871 P.2d 814, 816 
(1994). It is clear that Ms. Shea was an invitee. Under Idaho law: 
It is well settled in this state that, to hold an owner or 
possessor of land liable for injuries to an invitee caused by a 
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dangerous condition existing on the land, it must be shown 
that the owner or occupier knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have known, of the existence of the 
dangerous condition. 
Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., supra, at 778. 
Shea's Complaint asserts that she slipped and fell on ice. However, Ms. Shea's 
deposition testimony indicates that the ground was dry and she did not know what she 
slipped upon. In her deposition, Ms. Shea testified: 
Q. And when you were walking -- when you got out of your car, when you first 
put your feet on the ground as you got out of the d river's seat, do you 
recall wl1ether the ground was wet? Vv'hat was it? 
A. It was not wet. 
Q. Was it dry? 
A. It was dry. Everything was just amazingly dry just like right now. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 24, LL. 12 -19, (CR p. 42). 
Later, Ms. Shea testified that she did not know what caused her to slip and said: 
Q. When your left foot slipped, did you see what it slipped on? 
A. No. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 26, LL. 19 - 2-1). (CR p. 43). 
She later testified that the ground was dry. 
Q. Okay - - when you were getting out of the car and putting the tip money 
and as you started to walk around, did you see any snow or ice on the 
ground? 
A. There wasn't anything. There was just nice weather, and everything was 
so dry. Nothing would suggest that it could be that. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 30, LL. 20 -25). (CR p. 44). 
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Ms. Shea also testified: 
Q. Okay. When you - - at any time before you fell did you see any ice in the 
area of your car? 
A. No. I would be cautious. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 31, LL. 15-17). (CR p. 44). 
Similarly, Ms. Shea testified: 
Q. Okay. After this - - after you fell, did you notice whether there was any ice 
around your car? 
A. No. It wasn't. It was so dry and nice. 
Q. As I understood your testimony earlier, as near as you could tell where 
you walked was dry. Is that true? 
A. It was. Where I -I mean the spot where I fell. 
Q. Okay. It was dry? 
A. Because where-when I fell you can see on the picture there is never dry 
in the front of the car wash. 
Q. But at the time-
A It was dry everywhere else, but that spot." 
(Deposition of Ms. Shea, p. 65, L. 21 - p. 66, L. 6). (CR 46-47). 
Based on Shea's deposition testimony, it is readily apparent that she thought the 
ground was dry and her testimony does not establish what caused her to slip. 
Also, there is no evidence that Kevic knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care 
should have known, of the existence of the alleged dangerous condition. Under Idaho 
law, Shea has the burden to demonstrate that the owner or occupier knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the existence of the dangerous 
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condition. See Antim, supra, at 778. Shea has made no effort to establish that Kevic 
knew of or reasonably should have known of the existence of an allegedly dangerous 
condition where Shea fell. Thus, the District Court's decision granting Kevic's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was appropriate and consistent with Idaho law. 
In Giles v. Montgomery Ward, 94 Idaho 484, 491 P.2d 1256 (1971), the Court 
noted that in order to establish negligence of the landowner as against an invitee, it 
must be established that the landowner failed to keep the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition, or failed to warn the invitee of hidden or concealed dangers of which the 
owner or one in charge knew or should have known by exercise of reasonable care. In 
the Giles case, the Court noted that the record only provided a suggestion that the floor 
was slippery in a tiny spot. The record lacked any evidence that the condition was 
known to the owner or its employees or that it was of such a nature that the respondent 
in exercising reasonable care for the safety of its customers should have been aware of 
such a condition. Thus, the Giles court granted summary judgment. 
The Giles case was recently cited with approval in Antim, supra. In Antim the 
Court was facing a case where the plaintiff asserted that she tripped over a folded mat. 
However, the plaintiff failed to present any evidence to demonstrate when the mat was 
folded in order to establish how long it remained in a dangerous position prior to her fall. 
Thus, the Antim court dismissed the plaintiff's claim. 
In her Opening Brief, Shea refers this Court to McKinley v. Lyco Enterprises, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 792, 727 P.2d 1220 (1986) asserting that because this case involved an 
alleged slip on ice, there was a material question of fact. In McKinley, supra, the Court 
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indicates that the plaintiff asserts (and apparently testified) that he slipped and fell on 
ice. Here, however, Shea repeatedly testified that the ground was dry and she did not 
know what she slipped on. Thus, the McKinley case is readily distinguishable from this 
matter. 
When comparing this matter to the McKinley case, Shea argues that this case is 
about" 1) did the appellant slip on ice or mixture of ice and water and 2) did Kevic 
"know or should he have reasonably known, there was ice or mixture of ice and water at 
the end of his car wash." (Shea Opening Brief, pg. 13). (The appropriate location is 
the place of the accident, not the generic "end of the car wash.") Shea has the burden 
of proof on both of those propositions. As noted above, Shea testified that the ground 
was dry and that she did not know what she slipped on. Further, Shea failed to 
introduce any evidence that Kevic knew of should have known that the accident location 
was icy and/or constituted a dangerous condition. Thus, when the facts of this case, 
are reviewed using Shea's own analysis, the District Court properly granted Kevic's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Shea also cited the case of Ball v. Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 273 P.3d 1266 
(2012) for the proposition that summary judgment should not have been granted. In 
Ball, supra, the injured party and her husband both apparently testified that there was 
ice where the injured party fell. Thus, the substance that caused the fall was identified. 
Again, Shea testified that the ground was dry and that she did not know what she 
slipped on. Thus, the Ball decision is distinguishable. 
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Shea also that the District Court's reliance upon Antim v. Fred Meyer 
Stores, Inc., 150 Idaho 774, 251 P.3d 602 (Id. Ct. App. 2011) was erroneous. Shea 
attempts to create a "continuous condition" rule which somehow undermines and 
distinguishes the Antim decision. Shea is attempting to argue that the operation of the 
car wash creates an on-going situation where the ground is constantly wet and because 
of the cold temperatures, there is always ice present. However, Shea's testimony 
defeats that argument when she testified that the ground was "amazingly dry", She was 
asked, " .. after you fell, did you notice whether there was any ice around your car? She 
responded, "No, It wasn't. It was so dry and nice." (Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 36, LL. 
19-21). (CR p. 45). Thus, Shea's testimony contradicts the "continuous condition" 
theory being asserted and the District Court's reliance upon the Antim case was 
entirely appropriate. 
Shea cites to a general reference to the weather by Mr. Lett, it was "cold and icy" 
That reference was not directed towards the exact location where Ms. Shea fell, but 
instead, was generally directed at the car wash exit. That statement is insufficient to 
create a material question of fact. At best, Mr. Lett's statement constitutes a mere 
scintilla of evidence which is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 
D. PORTIONS OF SHEA'S AFFIDAVIT SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. 
After the Court granted Kevic's Motion for Summary Judgment, Shea filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration supported by her own Affidavit. (CR 32 - 39). Kevic 
asserts that a number of the statements contained within Shea's Affidavit were 
inconsistent with her previous deposition. Kevic filed a Motion and supporting 
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documents to strike portions of the Affidavit of Irina Shea. (Specifically, paragraphs 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of Shea's Affidavit) (CR 38-66) on the grounds 
that the Affidavit was untimely, contrary to I.R.C.P. 56(c), the Court's own Order and are 
inconsistent with Shea's previous deposition and are irrelevant and constitutes 
speculation and conjecture. 
Kevic acknowledges that the admissibility of Ms. Shea's Affidavit is an 
evidentiary issue and is subject to the "abuse of discretion" standard. Kevic would 
assert that the Affidavit was not filed in accordance with the timelines provided by IRCP 
56 (c) which requires that "If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits, he 
must do so at least fourteen days prior to the date of the hearing." Here, the Affidavit of 
Shea was submitted to this Court twelve days after the hearing. This Court has 
recognized the Court's discretion to strike an affidavit for being untimely. Sun Valley 
Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 5, 981 P.2d 236, 240 
(1999). During the hearing on August 23, 2012, Shea requested additional time to 
submit supplemental affidavits. An objection was lodged and the District Court denied 
Shea's Motion to file an Affidavit. (Transcript on Appeal, Hearing 8/23/2012, pg 20, L 
13, - pg. 22 L.25). Kevic again asserts that the submission of the Affidavit is untimely, 
contrary to the Court's ruling and contrary to IRCP 56(c). 
Kevic acknowledges that the Affidavit was filed as part of Shea's Motion for 
Reconsideration and that such Affidavits can be submitted for such motions under Rule 
11 (2) IRCP. Kevic asserts that there is a conflict between Rule 56(c) and Rule 11 (2) 
with regard to filing of affidavits. In general, the rules pertaining to statutory 
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construction, i.e., the more specific statute governs over a general statute. Wheeler v. 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 264, 207 P.3d 988, 995 (2008). 
Here, the deadlines contained in Rule 56(c) should govern. Kevic submits that if Shea 
can avoid the time constraints contained in Rule 56(c) by filing her Affidavit as a part of 
a Motion for Reconsideration, the timelines contained in Rule 56(c) are effectively 
eliminated and Summary Judgment hearing becomes mechanism where the party 
opposing summary judgment determines the Judge's thoughts and opinions and then 
prepares an Affidavit to address the Court's concerns. In order to retain the value of the 
timelines contained in Rule 56(c), Kevic submits that any affidavits which are submitted 
as a part of a Motion for Reconsideration should be based upon information which was 
not available at the time the Summary Judgment Motion was filed. An unexcused 
failure to present evidence at the time of the summary judgment is a valid basis for 
denying a subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Templet v. Hydrochem, 367 F. 3d 
473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004); also School District. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 
1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (the failure to file documents in an original motion or opposition 
does not turn the late filed documents into "newly discovered evidence.") 
Without waiving the timeliness argument, portions of Ms. Shea's affidavit are 
contrary to her deposition testimony. Idaho law does not allow affidavits to directly 
contradict prior deposition testimony. Such an affidavit may be disregarded on a 
summary judgment motion. See Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882 
P.2d 457, 465 (Id. Ct.App. 1994). Despite her deposition testimony that the area 
around her car was "amazingly dry" and that there was no ice around the car, of Shea's 
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Affidavit include statements (,-r,-r 5, 7, 8, 11, 14) of purported water and/or ice. Such 
statements are contrary to and contradict her previous deposition testimony. 
Kevic submits that the Affidavit of Shea is a sham affidavit and should be 
excluded. A sham affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony may be 
disregarded on a summary judgment motion, Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 
124 Idaho 607, 610, 862 P.2d 299, 302 (1993). In Arregui v. Gael/gos-Main, 153 
Idaho 801 291 P.3d 1000 (2012), this Court noted that it had not adopted the Sham 
Affidavit Doctrine. The Sham Affidavit Doctrine which has been previously utilized by 
the federal courts and Kevic submits that it should be applied to Ms. Shea's Affidavit. 
The Sham Affidavit Doctrine precludes parties from creating an issue of fact by 
submitting affidavits that contradict prior deposition testimony. Nelson v. City of Davis, 
571 F.3d 924, 927-28 (9th Cir.2009). The general rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a 
party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition 
testimony. Van Asdale v. International Game Technology, 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th 
Cir.2009). However, the Ninth Circuit has limited the scope of the Sham Affidavit 
Doctrine and in Van Asdale v. International Game Technology, 577 F.3d 989, 998 
(9th Cir.2009), the Ninth Circuit noted, "the sham affidavit rule 'should be applied with 
caution' " because the rule "is in tension with the principle that a court's role in deciding 
a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or weigh 
conflicting evidence." Van Asdale, supra at 998. Consistent with these concerns, the 
Ninth Circuit has "fashioned two important limitations on a district court's discretion to 
invoke the sham affidavit rule." First, "the inconsistency between a party's deposition 
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testimony and subsequent affidavit must be clear and unambiguous to justify striking the 
affidavit." Second, the Courts must "make a factual determination that the contradiction 
was actually a 'sham.'" Id. 
In Shea's Affidavit and in her Opening Brief, it asserts, "the appellant testified that 
the front of her car had a coat on the ground of what appeared at first to be water." 
(Shea Opening Brief, pg. 22.) Thus, her Affidavit asserts that the ground was wet, when 
her deposition testimony repeatedly indicated that the ground was dry and that she did 
not see what she slipped upon. (Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 26, LL. 19 - 21). (CR p. 
43). Shea also testified that prior to falling she did not see any ice in the area of her car. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 31, LL. 15-17). CR p. 44). Shea stated that after she fell, 
she did not see any ice around her car. (Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 36, LL. 19-21). CR 
p. 45). Thus, paragraph 17 of the Affidavit is inconsistent with her deposition testimony 
and the first limitation identified by the Federal Court has been satisfied. 
Shea's Affidavit was prepared and filed after the Court had issued its decision 
regarding Summary Judgment after the timeline for filing such affidavits had expired and 
was clearly intended to convince the District Court to reverse its decision. Thus, the 
second limitation identified by the Federal Court has been satisfied and Ms. Shea's 
Affidavit meets the requirements of a Sham Affidavit and should be stricken. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED BOTH OF SHEA'S MOTIONS 
FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
Shea has also appealed the District Court's decision denying Plaintiff's First 
and Second Motions for Reconsideration, both of which were made pursuant to Rule 
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11(b) I.R.C.P. Kevic asserts that the Court's denial of Shea's Motions for 
Reconsideration is consistent with Idaho law and should be upheld. 
In reviewing Shea's Motions for Reconsideration, it is significant that the only 
new information submitted with respect to either motion was Ms. Shea's Affidavit. 
Without waiving its argument that Ms. Shea's Affidavit should have been stricken, Kevic 
submits that even if the Affidavit is admitted or considered, the Court's ruling is still 
correct. The record is still devoid of any evidence that Kevic knew of the allegedly 
dangerous condition and/or should have known of the existence of a dangerous 
condition as required by Idaho law. Therefore, Shea can still not establish a prima facie 
case and the Court properly denied both of Shea's Motions for Reconsideration. 
F. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Both parties have claimed an award of attorney's fees on appeal. A party is 
entitled to attorney fees on appeal only if fees are authorized by statute, contract, or 
court rule. Capps v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 149 Idaho 737, 744, 240 P.3d 583, 590 
(2010). A citation to statutes and rules authorizing fees, without more, is insufficient. 
Carroll v. MBNA America Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 270, 220 P.3d 1080, 1089 (2009). In 
this case both Shea and Kevic assert that the opposing party's appeal was brought 
frivolously. Attorney's fees can be awarded on appeal under that statute [12-121] only if 
the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Gustaves v. Gus ta ves, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002). An award of attorney's fees 
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is appropriate if the appellant simply invites the appellate court to second-guess the trial 
court on conflicting evidence. Gustaves at 782. 
Shea's claim for attorney's fees is without merit. Here, the District Court granted 
Summary Judgment based upon the deposition testimony of Ms. Shea, and that Shea 
failed to produce any evidence that Kevic knew or should have known of the alleged 
dangerous condition. Kevic's arguments are based upon Shea's deposition and sound 
Idaho law. Thus, Kevic's arguments are not frivolous and Shea's claim for attorney's 
fees on appeal should be denied. 
Kevic asserts that it is entitled to attorney's fees for this appeal. An award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. §12-121 is appropriate when the appellant simply invites 
the appellate court to second-guess the trial on conflicting evidence. Bach v. Bagley, 
148 Idaho 784, 797, 229 P.3d 1146, 1159 (2010). Here, Shea is asking this Court to 
second guess the District Court on conflicting evidence and Kevic should be awarded 
the attorney's fees which it has incurred in preparing and responding to Shea's appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Shea's own deposition testimony establishes that the area where she slipped 
was dry and/or she does not know what she slipped upon. Further, Shea has not 
introduced any evidence to show that Kevic knew of or should have known of the 
allegedly hazardous condition. Thus, the District's Court's decisions granting Summary 
Judgment to Kevic and denying Shea's Motions for Reconsideration should be upheld. 
Because Shea is simply asking this Court to second-guess the District Court, Kevic 
should be awarded attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. §12-121. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this __ day of July, 2013. 
ANDERSON, 
~y .... 
C3hfj$'1r:·Hansen, Of the Firm, Attorneys for 
Defendants/Respondents/Cross Appellant 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this of July, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS/CROSS .A.PPELLANT'S RESPONSE 
AND OPENING BRIEF by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of 
record, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Henry D. Madsen 
MADSEN LAW OFFICE 
1044 Northwest Blvd, Ste B 
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83814 
Telephone: (208) 664-8080 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6258 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross 
Respondent 
[X] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
RESPONDENTS/CROSS APPELLANT'S RESPONSE AND OPENING BRIEF - 21 
